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In The Supreme Court

of the
State of Utah
LEO PORTER and NORA PORTER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.HYRUM PRICE,
Defendant and Respondent.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Leo Porter and Nora Porter, Plaintiffs, appeal from
a verdict rendered by a jury in the District Court of
Weber County, State of Utah.
The record on appeal is in two volumes, one of which
consists of the pleadings, minute entries and similar
papers, all references to this volume are designated by the
letter "R." The other volume which is separately numbered is a transcript of the testimony and proceedings
at the trial. References to this volume are designated by
the letter "T."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 29, 1958, Plaintiff Nora Porter was
seated in the automobil~ of Plaintiff Leo Porter, while
said automobile was parked parallel to the west curb of
Ogden Avenue, in Ogden, Utah, between 35th and 36th
Streets. Ogden Avenue runs in a north and south direction. The said automobile was facing south, was stationary and was approximately six (6) or eight (8) inches
from the west curb of Ogden Avenue. (Tr. 15, 20). The
ti1ne of day was 4 :40 p.m. ( Tr. 7). While in this position
the automobile of Plaintiff Leo Porter was struck headon by an automobile driven by the Defendant, Hyrum
Price (Tr. 7), causing injuries to Plaintiff Nora Porter,
who was seated in said automobile, and causing damage
to the automobile of Leo Porter.
The defendant, Hyrum Price, was afflicted with diabetes and had been so for seventeen (17) years (Tr. 84).
He is employed at Hill Air Force Base, and resided at
988-36th Street, which is south and east from the place
of the accident. On the date of the accident, :\Ir. Price
was transported from his place of employn1ent to a point
in West Ogden where he picked up his own automobile
and then drove east across the 2-!th Street viaduct, which
is approximately sixteen (16) blocks north of the place
of the accident. Defendant Price turned south on Lincoln
Avenue from 2-!th Street and claims to have no recollection of operating his autmnobile frmn that point to the
point of collision, although he drove fifteen (15) or six2
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teen ( 16) blocks through early evening, heavy traffic,
along streets regulated by eight (8) Semaphore signals
that he negotiated successfully. (Tr. ______ ). ~[r. Price admits to having been afflicted with diabetes for seventeen
(17) years (Tr. S-!). He has been under the constant care
of physicians who have attempted to educate him in r2gard to the disease and its control. Mr. Price admitted
to having several insulin reactions during the term of
the disease and was instructed by his physician to carry
candy (Tr. 85) with him at all times to curb insulin
reactions. He has no recollection as to whether or not he
carried candy with him on the day of the accident (Tr.
95).
:Mr. Price's sole defense to the suit of the plaintiffs
is that he had an insulin reaction that caused him to lose
consciousness and thus cause the accident. Mr. Price on
his deposition taken in April, 1959, claimed to have taken
sixty-five (65) or seventy (70) units of insulin on the
morning of the accident, and at the time of the trial he
claimed that he did not remember the exact dosage (Tr.
86).
Dr. Drew Petersen, specialist in internal medicine,
with considerable experience in diagnosing and treating
diabetic conditions, was defendant's physician and testified that l\Ir. Price, the defendant, had had a severe insulin reaction that had caused him to lose control of his
automobile and cause the accident. Dr. Petersen testified
that one of the causes of an insulin reaction was the tak-
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mg of an excessive dose of insulin ( rrr. 1-!5), and that
if the defendant took sixty-five ( 65) or seventy (70) units
of insulin on the day of the accident that this was an excessive dosage and would cause an insulin reaction (Tr.
1-!3). l\Ir. Price after the accident was regulated on
fifty (50) units of insulin and the recommended dosage
heforP the accident was fifty-five (55) units ( Tr. 162).
Dr. Petersen stated that most insulin reactions are
preceded by warning or premonitory symptoms (Tr. 146),
and that this reaction occurred at the time when it could
have been expected (Tr. 155).
Dr. 0. l\L Lewis, specialist in internal medicine,
with considerable experience in diagnosing and treating
diabetics, stated that he diagnosed the insulin reaction
suffered by l\Ir. Price as being caused by the Defendant
Price taking more insulin than was needed on the day
in question. (Tr. 120). Dr. Lewis was also of the opinion
that it was unlikely that the Defendant Price would not
feel some warning or other premonitory symptoms of the
corning on of the insulin reaction (Tr. 121), and that this
insulin reaction suffered by ~Ir. Price occurred at the
time when it could be expected ( Tr. 1:2:2).
STATEl\iENT OF POINTS TO BE ARGUED
POINT I.
THAT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS CONTRARY
TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF ·THE EVIDENCE.

4
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POINT II.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS.
POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5.
POINT IV.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 9.
POINT V.
·THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS CONTRARY
TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.

The evidence preponderantly shows that Mr. Price
had been a diabetic for seventeen (17) years (Tr. 84) and
in that time had suffered several insulin reactions which
if not checked would have caused him to lose consciousness. He knew that he could have such a reaction at any
time, and that if it happened while driving a motor vehicle
he would lose control of the vehicle and that probably
great injury and destruction would result to others. He
knew that an overdose of insulin would cause such a re-

5
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action. He adrnitted to taking such an overdose in a deposition taken in April, 1959, although at the time of the
trial in the month of August, 1959, he thought it more
discreet to not remember exactly how many units of insulin he had taken on the day of the accident. He knew
that if he was to have a reaction it would be at about
this time of the day. Both Dr. Petersen and Dr. Lewis
testified to this. (Tr. 122, 155). He claimed to have no
recollection of anything that occurred after he turned
on to Lincoln A venue fr01n 24th Street, but successfully
negotiated sixteen (16) blocks of heavy evening traffic
and negotiated eight (8) Semaphore signals and ·was in
the vicinity of his home when first observed by a friend,
Mr. Robert Call. (Tr. 7, 13). If the facts are as contended
by defendant, why didn't he lose control of the car at or
near the point of losing consciousness, rather than 16
blocks later.
This is not a case where unconsciousness is caused by
a physical disability that the driver has no knowledge
that he has and hence has no reason to suspect that he
would become incapacitated while driving and perhaps
cause injury to others. It is apparent also that it is unlikely that unconsciousness can1e upon :Jlr. Price without
some warning or other pren1onitory symptoms.
Defendant raises the defense that this accident was
unavoidable. However, the evidence is clear that because
of the defendant's diabetic condition that he could lose
consciousness at any time; that an insulin reaction which
6
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would bring on unconsciousness most likely would occur
preceding the evening meal and at the time of day that
this a<'eident occurred. That an overdose of insulin which
he admitted taking would cause a reaction and that if he
did have an insulin reaction while driving a motor ve··
hicle that great injury and destruction could occur to
others and their property, and thus we can only conclude
that it was negligent of defendant to drive under these
circumstances, and that if he insisted on driving a motor
vehicle in his condition that he would have to suffer the
consequences and bear the responsibility for any injury
or damage that he caused to others.
The conclusion seems justified that if the operaor
of a motor vehicle knew that he was subject to attacks,
in the course of which he was likely to lose consciousnes8,
such a loss of consciousness does not constitute a defense
in an action brought by a person injured as the result
of the operator's conduct while unconscious.
In Eleason v. Western Casualty & Surety Co. (1948)
35 N.W. 2d, 301, it appeared that the driver of a truck
suffered an epileptic seizure, became unconscious, and
lost control of the truck, with the result that the vehicle
struck a workman at the side of the street. It further
appeared that the driver knew that he was subject to
spells or seizures rendering him unconscious, although
he did not know that he had epilepsy. The court held
that the driver was negligent as a matter of law, since
under these circumstances the epileptic seizure was not an
7
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act of God and the collision was not an unavoidable accident and in so holding stated:
"The problem then becomes a question of
whether it is negligence for a man to drive a car
when he knows that he is subject to such spells.
It is considered that, as a matter of la-w, this is
negligence. The fact that the driver did not know
the technical name of his malady is not controlling.
What is important is that he knew that he might be
unable to control the car which he was driving.
He also must have known that if he lost control
of the car there was danger of someone being injured. Driving a car where people are to be met
with on highways today is dangerous enough if one
has complete control of his powers. vVhen a
driver knows that he 1nay become unconscious and
lose control at any moment, he must be held negligent in attempting to drive."
See also 28 A.L.R. 2d, page 40, Section 18 and 19.
A1nerican Juris prudence, Y ol. 5, Page 605, Sec. 179.
"One who knows he is physically unfit to
operate an automobile on the highway, as for example, that he is subject to attacks of such a character as ·will prevent his operating an auton1obile
as a reasonably prudent man would do, and nevertheless undertakes to drive on the highway, should
be held liable for an injury resulting when he sustains an attack while driving, by reason of which
he loses control of the car and causes an injury to
another.''

8
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Criminal liability has been founded upon a person
allowing himself to fall asleep while operating a motor
vehicle. Where negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle is the operative factor in determining criminal
responsibility a number of cases have held or recognized
that an automobile operator unconscious fr01n illness at
the time of an accident may nevertheless be found guilty
of a criminal offense under some circumstances. The
rationale of these cases is that a driver may be guilty
of criminal negligence in undertaking to drive when he
knows that he may black out or lose consciousness.
The Court held in People v. Decina (1956) 2 NY2d
133, 63 A.L.R. 2d, 970, that where the defendant, knowing
himself to be subject to epileptic attacks which could
cause unconsciousness for a considerable time, consciously undertook to drive on a public highway, suffered an
attack, and ran at high speed onto the sidewalk, resulting
in the death of four persons that culpable negligence within the intendment of the statute under which he wa~
charged was shown by defendant's electing to drive, knowing that he suffered from epilepsy, which would cause
him to become unconscious.
In holding sufficient an indictment charging that the
defendant lost control of his automobile during an epileptic seizure whereby another person was killed, and that
the defendant had prior knowledge that he was subject
to epileptic seizures which struck without warning from
time to time and rendered him unconscious and unfit to
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

operate an autornobile, the court in People v. Eckert, ~
NY2d 126, 63 A.L.R. 2d 985, held that the terms "reckless·'
and "culpably negligent" as used in the statute mean
son1ething nwre than the slight negligence necessary to
support a civil action for damages, and connotes conduct
where the actor has knowledge of the highly dangerom;
nature of his actions or knowledge of such facts as under
the circumstances would disclose to a reasonable man
the dangerous probability of serious bodily harm or death
under the particular circumstances of the case. The conduct of the defendant in driving with the knowledge that
he was subject to incapacitating seizures was held to
go beyond the bounds of lack of skill and foresight and
to demonstrate disregard of and indifference to th~
rights of others.
See also, People v. Freeman, (1943) 142 P.2d 435
(California.)
The Utah case of State v. Olsen, (1945) 160 P2d
427 has a direct bearing on the issue under discussion. In
this case, the driver, a woman, while driving a truck, felt
drowsy but continued to drive and fell asleep, losing control of the truck and the truck ran onto a sidewalk and
killed a child. The driver was charged with involuntary
manslaughter and convicted.
In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court
stated:

10
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"*** for while one cannot be liable for what he
does during the unconsciousness of sleep, he is
responsible for allowing hi1nself to go to sleepto get into a condition where the accident could
happen without his being aware of it, or able to
avoid it."
See also, William v. Frohock, 114 So2 221 (Fla.)
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON UN AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS.

"The law recognizes unavoidable accidents.
An unavoidable accident is one which occurs in
such a n1anner that it cannot justly be said to
have been proximately caused by negligence as
those terms are herein defined. In the event a
party is danmged by an unavoidable accident he
has no right to recover since the law requires
that a person be injured by the fault or negligence
of another as a prerequisite to any right to recover damages.''
The Court will recognize that this instruction haH
been taken verbatim from the Volume entitled "Jury
Insrtuctions for Utah," which would seem to give this
instruction some respectability. The annotation to this
instruction in "Jury Instructions for Utah" gives as
supporting authorities Nelson v. Lott, 17 P2 272, a Utah
case of 1932 which even at the time did not seem to
be substantial authority for this type of instruction; and
the California case of Parker v. Womack, 230 P2 823,
which was overruled as far as it would apply to Utah
11
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law by the case of B~digan v. Yellow Cab Company, a
California Supreme Court decision, found in 320 P2 500
at 505, which case was decided in 1958 and in so holding
the California Court stated:
"We are of the view that the rule applied in
Parker v. Womack 37 Cal. 2 116, 230 P2 823
should be reconsidered. In reality the so-called
defense of unavoidable accidents has no legitimate
place in our pleading.

"* * * * * Parker v. Womack is overruled
insofar as it is inconsistent with the views expressed herein."
Plaintiffs contend that the giving of any instruction
on unavoidable accident was erroneous under the circumstances of this case. Such an instruction would
be confusing and misleading and would lead the jury
to believe that if at the time of the impact the defendant was unconscious and could not control his
automobile that the accident was unavoidable, and the
jury would not give proper consideration to the question
of whether or not it is negligent for the defendant to
operate a motor vehicle in his physical condition.
In Butigan v. Yellow Cab Company, 320 P2 500
cited above held that the giving of an instruction on
unavoidable accidents was prejudicial and erroneous.
"In the modern negligence action the plaintiff
must prove that the injury complained of was

12
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proximah·l~·

raused h:· the defendant's negligence;
and the defendant under a general denial may
show an)· circu1nstances which militates against
his negligence or its causal effect. The so-called
defense of inevitable accident is nothing· moi'e
than a denial by the defendant of negligence or
a contention that his negligence· if any, was not
the proxilnate cause of injury. (Cases cited).
"The statement in the quoted instruction 'unavoidable' or 'inevitable accident' that these terms
·~imply denote an accident that occurred without
having been proximately caused by negligence'
informs the jury that the question of unavoidability or inevitability of an accident arises only
where the plaintiff fails to sustain his burden
of proving that the defendant's negligence caused
the accident. Since the ordinary instructions on
negligence and proxin1ate cause sufficiently show
that the plaintiff n1ust sustain his burden of proof
on these issues in order to recover; the instruction on avoidable accident serves no useful purpose. * * * * *.
"The instruction is not only unnecessary but
it is also confusing. When the jurors are told
that 'in law \Ve recognize what is te-rmed an
unavoidable or inevitable accident,' they may get
the impression that unavoidability is an issue to
be decided, and that if proved, it constitutes a
separate ground of non-liability ofthe defendant.
Thus they may be mislead as to the proper manner of determining liability; that is solely on the
basis of negligence and proxi1nate causation. The
rules concerning negligence and proximate causation which must be explained to the jury are in
themselves complicated and difficult to understand.

13
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"A further complication resulting from the
unnecessary concept of unavoidability or inevitability and its problematic relation to negligence
and proximate cause can lead only to misunderstanding • * • • •.
u The giving of a confusing or mtsleading instruction is of course error, and we are of the
view that in the absence of a special situation
of the type discussed above ( Californva statute
cited) the use of an unavoidable accident tnstruction should be disapproved." (Italic ours.)

In Carlburg v. Wesley Hospital and Nurse Trairrn'ng
School (Kansas) 323 P2 638, the Kansas Supreme Court
upheld the District Court in refusing to give a requested
instruction on unavoidable accident, stating as follows:
"Generally speaking· when an accident is
caused by negligence, there is no room for application of the doctrine of 'unavoidable accident'
even though the accident may have been 'inevitable' or 'unavoidable' at the time of its occurrence
and one is not entitled to the protection of the
doctrine if his negligence has created, brought
about or failed to re1nedy a dangerous condition
resulting in a situation where the accident is
thus 'inevitable' or 'unavoidable' at the time of
its occurrence. In other words, a person is liable
for the combined consequences of an 'inevitable'
or 'unavoidable' accident and his own negligence.
"The facts of the accident in the case at bar
do not bring it u:ithin the doctrine of 'unavoidable acciJdent.' The term 'unavoidable accident'

14
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excludes and rrpcls ·the idea of ·negligence. It i.-.·
an occurrcllce 1chich is not contributed· to by the
JIC!Jli!JCilt act or omission by either party. The
term is synonomous 1cith (mere accident" or (pure
accident.' These terms imply that ·the accident
1cas caused lJ y some unforeseen and unavoidab!e
event over 1rhich neither party had control. (Italics ours.)

In the case Paskil v. Leigh· Rich Corp. 340 P2 741
(California) which was a personal injury action arising
when plaintiff fell while bowling, the Court stated:
"Turning now to the specific question
whether it was error under the facts of this case
to give the 'unavoidable accident' instruction, the
following language from Halleck v. Brown, 164
Cal. Appeal 2 586, 330 P2 852, 854 appears to
be controlling. (It is well settled that the givtng
of the unavo~dable accident instruction is prejudicial where the evidence discloses no condition
and no action or conduct apart from the conduct
of the parties that could reasonably have been
found sufficient. to aquit them of negligence."
(Italics ours.)
See also Tomchik v. Julian (California) 340 P2 72.
Plaintiffs contend that the giving of the instruction
objected to gave to the defendant an unfair advantage
and one that he was not entitled to, and that it served
only to confuse and mislead the jury and was prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiffs.
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POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5.

Plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 5 reads as
follows:
"If the defendant, Hyrum Price, knew that
because of his diabetic condition he was subject
to attacks in the course of which he was likely
to lose consciousness but nevertheless operated a
motor vehicle on a public highway and while in
a state of unconsciousness caused by his diabetic
condition, drove his automobile onto the wrong
side of the road and into the automobile in which
Plaintiff K ora Porter was seated, causing damage
to the motor vehicle owned by Leo Porter and
injury to Nora Porter, you will find the Defendant, Hyrum Price, was negligent in causing the
said collision and will award judgment to the
plaintiffs for such damages and injuries as you
find were caused by and are the proximate result of defendant's negligence."
The evidence showed that the Defendant, :Mr. Price,
had been under the care of various physicians for seventeen (17) years for the treatment of diabetes, and that
during that time he had had several insulin reactions;
and that he was well aware that he could have an
insulin reaction at any time which would cause him to
lose consciousness unless he was able to arrest the reaction. Both the physicians testified that these insulin
reactions could occur without warning although this was
improbable. Under these circumstances, the driver who

16
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loses t•on~eiou::-;np::-;:-; and thereby loses control of his
automobile is' nPgligent as a matter of hn\" and ,the aho\~e
instrudion should have been submitted' to th~ jury.

'.

American J uri~prudenee, Y olume 5, page 605, section 179;
:2~

A.L.R. 2d, page 40; section 18'

Eleason Y. \Yestern Casualty & Surety Co., 35 NvV2
page 301;
See also State v. Olson (Utah) 160 P2 ±27.
POINT IV.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO ..9.

The requested instruction reads as follows:
"You are instructed that it is the duty of a
person who operates a motor vehicle upon the
public highways to maintain himself in such a
physical condition that he can operate the said
motor vehicle in such a manner as an ordiliary
prudent man could do, and he is responsible
for any damage or ~njury he causes to. the prop~
erty or persons of others if he allows himself to
get into a condition where an accident could
happen without his being aware of it or ·able
to avoid it, and if you find that defendant s_uffered from diabetes, and in any manner, did not
properly care for himself so as to allow himself
to get into a physical condition where he could
lose control of his automobile while operating

17
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said automobile upon public highway, you will
find the defendant negligent if you find that
defendant did in fact lost control of his automobile because he failed to maintain himself in
proper physical condition."
Testimony of defendant in his deposition taken in
April 1959 was that on the day in question he had injected himseLf with either sixty-five ( 65) or seventy
(70) units of insulin. He did not remember which. The
testimony of his physician was that he had prescribed
that l\ir. Price, the defendant, take only fifty-five (55)
units at that time, and that either sixty-five (65) or
seventy (70) units would be an overdose and would
cause such a reaction as defendant claims to have had
and would cause unconsciousness. In taking the overdose
of insulin, defendant failed to properly maintain himself
in a proper physical condition, knowing that if the sugar
content in his blood was out of balance that he would
lose consciousness, and if this occurred while driving
his car that he would lose control of the car with the
possibility that he would injure someone who was in his
line of travel.
This would appear to be a stronger case against
the defendant than was found in the case of State v.
Olsen (Utah) 160 P2 427 where the driver of a truck
was found guilty of criminal negligence and convicted
of involuntary manslaughter when she fell asleep while
driving, ran up on a sidewalk and killed a child.

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT V.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING 'TO GIVE
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 10. ·

The requested instruction reads as follows :
"You are instructed that in determining
\\'hether or not defendant was guilty of negligence
and colliding with the automobile of Leo Porter
on the day and at the time in question, you may
take into consideration that he was afflicted with
a disease known as diabetes, as a result of which
he was subject to attacks which could occur with
or without warning to defendant, and that such
attacks were of such a character as would prevent his operating an automobile as an ordinary,
prudent man would do."
The evidence has clearly shown that the defendant
was suffering with a disease known as diabetes and had
been so afflicted for the past seventeen (17) years. That
during that time he had suffered several insulin re-.
actions, and the evidence also shows that the cause 9f
his losing consciousness on the day in question, if he
did so, was an insulin reaction. It is the contention of
the defendant that such a reaction came on without
warning.
In the ease of Williams v. Fro"hock (Florida) 114
So:2, 221, the defendant while driving in downtown 11:ianri'
(Florida) in the day time suffered a sudden illness in
which he "blacked out." His car went out of control,
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leaped the curb, and injured the plaintiff who was a
pedestrian on the sidewalk. The defendant had suffered
loss of consciousness several times before but never
while driving. His physician had not diagnosed his
condition as one furnishing a propensity for repetition
and had never told him not to drive. On a jury verdict,
the defendant was found to be negligent in causing
the accident, and judgment was rendered for plaintiff
for Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) and No/100 Dollars
compensatory damages. Plaintiff, the prevailing party,
appealed because the Court excused the defendant for
gross negligence and withdrew from the jury the consideration of punitive damages.
Insofar as the decision of the District Court of
Appeals of Florida relates to the issue of defendant's
negligence, it affirmed the verdict and stated:
"It is the law of this state as recognized by
the Supreme Court in Bridges v. Speer, 79 So2
679, 681 'that where one has notice or knowledge
of the existence of a physical impairment which
may c01ne on suddenly and destroy his power to
control an automobile, it is negligence to an extreme degree for such persons to operate his
vehicle.' (Italics Ours.)
"Ordinarily the fact that a person has one
or more sick fainting spells over a period of
years could well be considered enough to put
such a party on notice that it could and might
happen again at any time such as while driving
an automobile."
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It is to be noted that in the case cited above although the Court found that defendant's medical history
was not such as to necessarjly give him a "premonition
or warning of his condition,'' it affirmed the finding
of negligence.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs contend that it is immaterial whether
defendant experienced any premonitory symptoms prior
to losing consciousness. If he had warning symptoms
and did not heed them, he was negligent. He had know~
ledge that it was a reasonably foreseeable possibility
that he could have an insulin reaction at any time and
lose consciousness. Knowing that such was the case, it
is only just that the responsibility for the accident
should rest squarely upon the defendant, and that
plaintiffs should not be completely helpless and without
remedy. Add to this, the fact that defendant induced
the severe insulin reaction by a greatly excessive injection of insulin, and it must be concluded that this
accident was a result of defendants negligence and not
unavoidable. If the defendant lost consciousness sixteen
(16) blocks north of the point of the accident, a reasonable person may well ask, "If the facts are as stated
by the defendant, why did he not lose control of his
automobile at or near the point of losing consciousness
rather than safely negotiating his automobile through
si.:deen (16) blocks of heavy evening traffic, negotiating
successfully eight (8) semaphore signals and various stop
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signs, and losing control of ?is automobile in the near
vicinity of his home f'
The only fair conclusion to arrive at is that the
defendant did have warning or knowledge that he was
suffering or about to suffer an insulin reaction which,
if left unchecked, would cause him to lose consciousness,
but that he was attempting to get home in order to
treat himself, and in thus taking a long-shot chance
took other people's lives in his hands.
The verdict of the jury must be reversed and the
cause remanded solely for the purpose of determining
plaintiffs' damages.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE B. HANDY
Attorney for Appellant
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